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INTRODUCTION 
During die decade following the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in 
1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran sought to spread its revolution among the 
Muslim nations and to fight the United States and Israel throughout the Middle 
East. Beginning with their seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, 
Khomeini's followers undertook what some have deemed an undeclared low-
intensity war against the United States in the Middle East and elsewhere.1 Much 
of this campaign took the form of terrorist actions, such as vehicle-bombings, 
hijackings, kidnappings and murders in which Iran or Iranian-sponsored groups 
have been implicated. 
Although terrorist acts against enemies of the new Islamic regime began 
in 1979 their incidence dramatically increased in the period from 1982 to 1985.2 
While the overall numbers of incidents after 1985 declined, only the Islamic 
Republic of Iran continued to show an increased reliance on terrorism as an 
instrument of its foreign policy among state sponsors of terrorism.3 In addition, 
until the recent indictment of two Libyan officials, there was a large body of 
evidence which suggested that Iran had sponsored the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 
Flight 103, an event which had underscored the increasing lethality and 
sophistication of modem international terrorism.4 
Since 1988, however, major events both in the Middle East and world-
wide have begun to affect the course of Iranian involvement in terrorism and 
other forms of low-intensity conflict. First, the death of Khomeini on 3 June 
1989 marked the beginning of a transitional period in Iran. If recent trends 
persist and the more moderate leadership retains the ascendancy, they might 
foreswear the use of terrorism completely. With the defeat of Bacthist Iraq in 
the 1991 Gulf War Iran once again has emerged by default as potentially the 
leading power in the Persian Gulf region. Since men Iran has shown some 
willingness to improve relations with Gulf Cooperation Council nations. Moreo-
ver, the outcome of the war left the United States in a position of predominant 
influence in the region, an advantage it has exploited to push its own agenda, 
including advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, because of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as a cohesive political system, Soviet influence in 
the Middle East has declined in relative terms to that of the United States, and 
no longer serves to offset American power there. For Iran, struggling with 
reconstruction and economic hardships following its eight year war with Iraq, 
this new reality would also seem to require mending ties with the United States 
as the necessary price for obtaining reconstruction aid and ensuring the stability 
of its regime. The recent release of long-held hostages may be a step in that 
direction. All these events would indicate the prudence and the likelihood of 
Iran renouncing its reliance on terrorism and insurgency. 
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Such optimism, however, begs the question to what degree Iranian-
sponsored terrorism really is responsive to changes in the international environ-
ment. This article argues radier mat Iranian sponsorship of international 
terrorism has been and remains largely a reflection of its internal politics. These 
domestic politics remain insular and unresponsive to external changes due to the 
continuing factionalism of the Islamic regime which reinforces a more parochial 
perspective among Iranian leaders. In addition to arguing that Iranian involve-
ment in terrorism is more an external extension of intramural domestic politics 
than it is a reflection of deliberate foreign policy this article will also briefly 
consider whether such terrorism might represent a continuing threat to the West. 
MAINTAINING REVOLUTIONARY DYNAMISM 
From 11 February 1978 (when the Ayatullah Khomeini proclaimed the 
Islamic State), up to the present two processes have dominated Iranian politics, 
namely, consolidating the Islamic state and institutionalizing the Islamic revo-
lution. What distinguished Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalists from other 
anti-Shah revolutionaries or nationalists was that they held rebuilding Iranian 
society upon the Sharfah, the sacred law of Islam, to be the main goal and 
justification of the revolution. In Twelve Imam Shicite Islam, which is dominant 
in Iran, enforcing Islamic law requires its continual authoritative interpretation 
by the mujtahids, the qualified doctors of Islamic jurisprudence who alone are 
held to possess the learning, piety, and apostolic authority essential for this task.5 
In effect making Islamic law prevail in Iran required the Islamic clergy 
to assume direct rule themselves rather than merely advising a republic gov-
erned by laymen. Thus the revolution against the Shah ending on 11 February 
1979 was followed by a struggle between the Islamic fundamentalists and those 
nationalists or leftists who had a more secular vision of Iran's future. This began 
in earnest in August 1979 with disputes within the Constituent Assembly 
charged with drafting a new constitution and ended with the fundamentalists 
ousting President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr in the summer of 1981. Since then 
political conflict within the Islamic Republic has centered on disagreements 
among the fundamentalists over the nature of the Islamic state and the proper 
scope of the Islamic revolution. Building even an Islamic state requires creating 
stability and order, but the companion goal of maintaining the revolution's 
dynamism often has entailed fighting the re-assertion of routine and bureauc-
racy required by state-building. 
Although the Islamic revolutionaries inherited a fairly intact govern-
ment bureaucracy and military they perceived that, left unchallenged, these 
institutions' internal inertia could have resisted Islamization indefinitely. Since 
in the case of the military this risk was unacceptable, early on the Islamic 
revolutionaries created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to 
protect the revolution against possible military coups. Similarly a network of 
revolutionary neighborhood watch committees was set up assuming many 
functions of the municipal police. 
In order to initiate the broader masses into the political culture of the 
revolution, Khomeini created a "Construction Effort" (Jihad-e Sazandegi) that 
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dispatched educated, young city-dwellers to slums and rural areas to aid those 
living in the margins of Iranian society. This also served to inculcate the values 
of the revolution into the participating middle class youth. In urban areas the 
newly-created Martyrs' Foundation and the Foundation for the Oppressed 
maintained dole funds for a large unemployed class that soon could be deployed 
as club-wielders against the political opponents of the regime. Alongside the 
former regime's civil courts, modelled on those of Switzerland, appeared the 
Islamic Revolutionary Courts which eventually became Sharfah courts replac-
ing the civil court system. 
Both the revolutionary foundations that were created alongside existing 
government institutions and the Islamic associations that sprung up throughout 
the various offices served to bring the state into the "line of the Imam." In 
contrast with the various secular parties such as the National Front or the 
Freedom Movement, which seldom encompassed more than the members of one 
social class or clique, the Islamic revolutionaries created a three-level political 
machine that cut across all social strata, mobilizing a mass following. The first 
level was the Islamic Republic Party which in form resembled any other party 
in recruiting members, backing lists of candidates, and publishing a daily paper, 
Jumhuri-yi Islami. It drew many of its secular members from the bazaar 
merchants and also among rank and file employees of the government offices. 
Yet, parallel to this secular structure was the second level, the revolutionary 
clergymen who were to become, in effect, the philosopher-kings of the new 
regime. These parallel networks of laymen and clerics were coordinated by the 
"Imam's representatives" appointed to every government office, every army 
unit, and every factory. Each representative conveyed the Imam's instructions 
and indoctrination to members of local Islamic Republic Party chapters and 
Islamic Associations that sprung up throughout state and society. 
On the lowest level the Hizb'allah, literally the "Party of God," consisted 
mainly of the able-bodied unemployed.6 They were mobilized and supervised 
on behalf of the Imam by the Friday Prayers leaders, the clerics attached to local 
mosques, or the trustees in charge of the religious bequests that ordinarily served 
as charity and social welfare organizations. The clergymen's work also 
involved material relief efforts among these poor doled out with a heady 
indoctrination into the revolutionary version of Islam being promoted by the 
Imam. In return the Hizb'allah would volunteer themselves for "spontaneous 
demonstrations," to break up demonstrations by non-regime elements, and to 
provide recruits for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Khomeini extolled the 
Hizb'allah as the mustazafin, that is, the "humble and dispossessed of the Earth," 
to whom he had especially promised the blessings of the Islamic Republic and 
its ongoing revolution. 
This three-fold political front formed a mass movement dooming more 
conventional parties from the start; within the government offices the Islamic 
fundamentalists would obstruct and neutralize the programs of any nationalists 
or liberals who already held official appointments or had won elections. 
Western-educated intellectuals in public life who remained outside of the "line 
of the Imam" eventually found themselves being attacked by the militant 
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clergymen's sermons and writings. When the secular and nationalist elements 
tried to stage their own show of force against the Islamic fundamentalists, the 
Hizb'allahis were already mobilized to riot, fight, and maim on behalf of the 
Imam. 
In the course of the first few years (1979-1982) these revolutionary 
organizations became institutionalized and the various liberal or nationalistic 
groups and personalities were isolated and picked off one by one. Having 
eliminated any viable opposition, the supporters and functionaries of the new 
Islamic state next turned their rivalries and suspicions inward upon their own 
ranks. The regime often harnessed these intramural rivalries and ambitions by 
delegating identical tasks to different government offices. While this caused 
duplication of efforts, quarreling among officials, and intra-governmental turf-
battles, nonetheless such internal competition ensured that efforts to fulfill the 
goals of the revolution would not languish due to official complacency or quiet 
obstructionism. 
TERROR SERVING THE REVOLUTION 
The tension between state-building and maintaining the momentum of 
the revolutionary spirit tended to perpetuate sectarian factionalism among the 
fundamentalists and to encourage ready recourse to manipulative coercion 
against those in their ranks who failed to conform perfectly to the prevailing 
doctrine of the hour. As long as there remained a Shah, or nationalists, or liberals 
to fight against, all Islamic revolutionaries could agree on the priority of purging 
those enemies. However, after defeating their last secular enemies, they then 
found it much harder to maintain a consensus on how to translate their 
revolutionary rhetoric into concrete policy to run the country. Like other 
revolutionary ideologues who have won power, the Islamic fundamentalists 
found that the practical demands of maintaining power and running a govern-
ment required compromises with their perfectionist ideals. An example of this 
in the domestic dimension can be seen in the rehabilitation of former S AVAK 
agents in order to rebuild a new intelligence and security capability. In Iran's 
foreign policy one example was its effective alliance with the Ba°thist and anti-
fundamentalist Syrian regime against the common Iraqi enemy. Such compro-
mises invariably created dissent by those who sensed pending betrayal of the 
revolution. 
As Adam Westoby noted with respect to the Soviet experience, "the 
function of personality cults has been to raise ideologies of rule above any 
danger of being examined for heresy."7 Leszek Kolakowski similarly argued 
that the Soviet purges sought to destroy independent criticism among the 
revolutionaries by convincing them that "they had no ideology or loyalty except 
to the latest order from on high."8 Counterparts in the Iranian revolution have 
been the elevation of the "line of the Imam" above even the decrees of the Quran 
and the repeated paksazi (purging) of those who have failed to conform 
themselves to the latest twists in that line.9 Even clergymen as prominent as 
Ayatullah Muntaziri, Khomeini's original choice as successor, have been 
among the casualties of such purges, though the Iranian clergy have managed to 
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maintain an outward show of solidarity in spite of the reported intramural 
tensions and differences that have occasioned these purges.10 
Both the networks uniting Iran's clergymen and the alignments dividing 
them predate the revolution, being rooted in their common schooling in the 
traditional theological colleges and in the hierarchic lines joining each cleric to 
different spiritual mentors among the senior mujtahids. The Iranian clergy are 
notoriously cliquish and reticent, seldom confiding details of their intramural 
alliances or divisions to others even among their own lay followers.11 The 
network joining the Shrate clergymen of Iran and Lebanon began under the 
auspices of Ayatullah al Uzma Burujirdi in the 1950s, but only began to take on 
a revolutionary character after the arrival in Lebanon of the Iranian clergyman 
Musa Sadr, founder of Amal.12 Later others, such as Hujjatulislam Muhammad 
Muntaziri, gathered up their arms and followers and went off to Lebanon in order 
to fight alongside Amal against the Phalangists. 
As early as 1944 a few clergymen had created a terrorist organization, 
the Fidofiyan-i Islam, the "self-sacrificers of Islam," to assassinate those 
perceived as being enemies of Islam within Iranian society.13 Following the fall 
of the Shah one former Fidcfi, Sadiq Khalkhali, dispensed free-lance "revolu-
tionary Islamic justice" even prior to the official formation of the Islamic courts. 
Khalkhali also had ties to the Iranian chargé d' affairs in Baghdad, Hujjatulislam 
Douci, who together were engaged in plots against the Iraqi regime long before 
Iran officially backed the export of the revolution or sanctioned the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein. Just as the Islamic Republic sought to consolidate the 
various functions and activities of its partisans within Iran it likewise tried to 
coordinate rationally such clandestine activities outside its borders. Therefore, 
the January 1980 Liberation Movements Conference in Tehran and similar 
subsequent conferences, helped to organize, discipline, and co-opt the Islamic 
revolutionary movements outside of Iran. 
By making the export of the revolution a top priority of the Islamic 
Republic, Khomeini deflected public attention within Iran from die daunting 
problems the regime faced in rebuilding a shattered economy for which ready 
solutions were lacking.14 From another viewpoint, however, by involving Iran 
in revolutionary ventures elsewhere, the more adamant Islamic revolutionaries 
were able to hold the country ' s internal politics hostage to their own agenda. The 
seizure of the US Embassy provides the most obvious example of this: by 
August of 1979 the Islamic fundamentalists saw nationalistic 'liberals', such as 
Mehdi Bazargan and Bani Sadr, as their closest-running competitors at home 
and therefore as their natural political enemies. When Bazargan tried to create 
improved relations between Iran and the United States, the Islamic fundamen-
talists directed their student following to take over the US Embassy, effectively 
crushing that effort and discrediting Bazargan. The export of die revolution 
continues to remain a fulcrum for certain factions to apply their own pressures 
on Iran's domestic politics. 
Presently at least three clerical factions contend for power wkhin Iran. 
Shifts in alignments and the obscurity of their intramural differences defy efforts 
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to sort these clergymen into clear-cut categories of "moderates" or "radicals," 
but one can discern some major tendencies by noting how individuals and 
factions rank their priorities for the regime:15 One pole, whose adherents could 
be best designated as institutionalists, holds that building institutions, public 
order, and social and economic stability at home should take precedence over 
pursuing an external revolutionary agenda. The opposite pole, whose adherents 
could be best designated as revolutionists, believes that achieving unfulfilled 
revolutionary priorities, namely, fighting Israel and the United States, and 
aiding the 'oppressed' while opposing 'dependent, reactionary regimes' in the 
region, are more important than domestic development and prosperity. Among 
such revolutionists are the former Interior Minister c Ali Akbar Muhtashami and 
the former Prosecutor General, Khoiniha, who was once the Imam's representa-
tive among the students holding the US Embassy hostages. A third category is 
made up mainly of 'politicos' among the Islamic fundamentalists who switch 
support from one side to the other as politically expedient. Iran's current 
President, cAli Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, may be the most prominent exam-
ple of such pragmatists.16 None of these factions, however, actually disavows 
pursuing the export of the revolution or pan-Islamism as strategic objectives of 
the Islamic Republic nor do any question the propriety of using terrorism or 
supporting insurgencies against other governments as means to achieve these 
objectives. 
The most burning issue on which the two extremes would disagree 
would be the question of Iran resuming friendly relations with the Western 
nations and, in particular, with the United States. While the institutionalists 
might accept this as a necessary evil, the revolutionists would oppose this as a 
complete sell-out of the revolution. On this issue the revolutionists could 
effectively veto any such process of reconciliation by threatening or carrying out 
terrorist actions against Western or US interests through groups under their 
sponsorship. Such actions would provoke a hostile public reaction in the West 
against Iran which would reciprocally enflame the public atmosphere within 
Iran to make the conciliatory policies of the institutionalists politically infeasi-
ble. External terrorism thus becomes a means for keeping the revolution 'on 
track' according to the revolutionists' own agenda. This suggests that some 
terrorist actions sponsored by Iran abroad might be better understood in terms 
of their political utility to revolutionists inside Iran than in terms of some abstract 
Islamic-cum-revolutionary ideals. 
If this hypothesis is true then one circumstance in which these 
revolutionists might contemplate and carry out a terrorist campaign directed 
against the United States would be the attempt by the institutionalists to 
normalize relations with the United States. Such actions could include bomb-
ings, or hijacking US air or ocean carriers, or even terrorist actions on US soil. 
The aim would be to sabotage US-Iranian reconciliation, either by creating the 
impression that the Iranian government was behind such actions or else by 
demonstrating the inability of Tehran to control the actions of its erstwhile 
protégés. 
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EXTERNAL TERRORISM REVIEWED 
Iran's own revolutionary experience has become the pattern for its 
attempts to spread its revolutionary message. Wherever Iran has sought to 
export its revolution, its first task has been to bring together there a nucleus of 
revolutionary Islamic clergymen dedicated to Khomeini's vision of Islam. 
These, in turn, would begin recruiting their more educated and talented lay 
followers into nascent revolutionary organizations. Finally, this network, 
extending through mosques and associated community institutions, would 
mobilize the Muslim poor at large in the targeted area. 
An important consequence of the foregoing was that Iranian Islamic 
revolutionaries found the most fertile soil for their revolutionary message in 
those Muslim lands having the same social elements with which to build a mass 
movement as existed in Iran. Lebanon had a large number of Twelve Imam 
Shicites, including a native clerical leadership, a small cadre of well-educated 
and ambitious laymen, and a large number of poor, uneducated followers who 
had their own peculiar litany of grievances against bom the exclusionary 
confessional system in pre-1975 Lebanon and the Palestinian occupiers in 
southern Lebanon. Iran has had more success in replicating its own revolution-
ary pattern there than elsewhere, although it is not an unqualified success. The 
Shica of Lebanon are split between the pro-Iranian Hizb'allah and the more 
indigenous Amal movement, and even the Hizb'allah appear at times to be more 
responsive to the peculiarities of Lebanese domestic politics man to guidance 
from Tehran. 
Iran's leaders concentrated on exporting their Islamic revolution to other 
lands within the Muslim world. They were particularly preoccupied with Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf emirates and Lebanon, states forming part of the 
core of the Islamic world and having large Shicite communities. This preoccu-
pation, however, did not rule out directing terrorist operations in non-Muslim 
lands against governments, institutions, or persons perceived as active enemies 
of the Islamic Republic. 
Two circumstances strongly suggest that Iranian state sponsorship of 
terrorism abroad has been a decentralized operation, not fully accountable to, or 
managed by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; rather, it was 
subject to being co-opted by maverick political operators. First, mere was a 
repeated pattern of increases in terrorist activities whenever the institutionalists 
have tried to pursue more conciliatory foreign policies. Second, much of the 
evidence documenting Tehran's direct promotion of terrorist activities also 
documents that it chronically lacked direct oversight or control over those 
operations. 
Evidence regarding the conduct and structure of Iranian-sponsored 
terrorist operations is actually very scant, being based more on signal intelli-
gence than on human sources wimin the Iranian government or terrorist 
infrastructure.17 However, certain deductions can still be made from evidence 
in the public record. By tracking the events bearing on the implementation of 
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terrorist policies and programs by the Iranian regime one can make the following 
observations. 
First, multiple organizational structures were created for the conduct of 
terrorist operations. This permitted duplication without centralization except 
through the person of the Imam. Moreover, these structures were removed from 
regular bureaucratic oversight. Not long after the 1979 revolution a department 
for liberation movements had been set up in the Foreign Ministry. At that time 
the Islamic fundamentalists perceived the Foreign Minister Sadeq Qutbzadeh as 
being outside of the Imam's "Line" and not trustworthy. The 1980 Liberation 
Movements Conference was the occasion used by the fundamentalists to change 
the jurisdiction of the department for liberation movements from the Foreign 
Ministry to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a context in which they 
could pursue their own version of exporting the revolution while side-stepping 
the detested Qutbzadeh. The eventual creation of the "Department [for support] 
of Liberation Movements," by decree of the Imam following this Conference, 
created one command structure for conducting terrorist operations. This office 
began sending IRGC units to Lebanon in June 1981. 
When Khomeini later complained that the export of the revolution had 
not been pursued with sufficient vigor, the Islamic Guidance Ministry issued a 
memorandum on 26 May 1984 concerning the creation of "an independent 
brigade for carrying out irregular warfare in enemy territory."18 Meanwhile, 
various of the "revolutionary foundations," in particular the Martyrs' Founda-
tion, had also become fronts for rendering support to terrorist activities. This 
multiplication, without evident centralization, of operational commands lent 
itself easily to maverick operations. 
The lack of a central governing policy seems evident from one striking 
anomaly: on 9 August 1984 Imam Khomeini declared the use of hijacking and 
mining to be "against the sentiments of world opinion, against Islam, and against 
common sense."19 In fact, however, the Martyrs' Foundation, under the control 
of Ayatullah Karrubi, a Khomeini appointee, continued to run a terrorist training 
camp outside Mashhad, whose curriculum included hijacking and suicide 
mission training. Karrubi himself appears to have been intimately involved in 
me planning of the TWA 847 hijack on 14 June 1985 and of the hijacking of 
Kuwaiti Airway's Flight 422 on 5 April 1988.20 
Although this disregard for the Imam's decree evident in his followers' 
deeds could be counted as a type of official duplicity, a simpler explanation 
equally consistent with the facts would be that there was never much policy 
coordination between the Imam, the Iranian state, and the various operational 
commands. The 1984 Islamic Guidance Ministry memorandum reveals another 
anomaly: in it, a Mr. "Mir Hashem,"21 head of the World Islamic Movements 
office, informed representatives of the IRGC and Iranian Armed Forces that his 
organization already had suicide groups formed and functioning. If this meeting 
in May 1984 was, in fact, the first attempt to coordinate the Iranian Armed 
Forces and IRGC in support of external insurgency and terrorist operations, this 
at least would imply that the Iranian state had lacked prior supervision of those 
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operations already carried out by his group, which nonetheless had been able to 
use the resources of die Iranian state in its many operations. Following the 
suicide bombings in Lebanon, including the 18 April 1983 and 23 October 1983 
bombings in Lebanon, US intelligence intercepted telecommunications indicat-
ing the involvement of the Iranian Embassy in Damascus and the IRGC in the 
Biqa valley.22 Ordinarily such use of diplomatic facilities and of military 
personnel would be considered sufficient proof of state sponsorship of terror-
ism. But, an alternative explanation was that the revolutionary factions within 
Iran were able to usurp control over part of the diplomatic and military apparatus 
of the Iranian state while other state offices dominated by the institutionalises 
were kept uninformed of those activities. 
Further support for this interpretation is found in the fact that, even given 
die grant of authority by Imam Khomeini to pursue this integration of paramili-
tary operations, Mir Hashem still demanded a cover for the creation of the 
brigade because of "legal impediments" (ishkal-i qanuni) attached to the 
project. The only such "legal impediments" to be considered would have been 
those arising under the laws of Iran. In that case, insofar as the brigade would 
be cloaked under the structure of the regular Armed Forces and the Revolution-
ary Guard Corps, even the Imam Khomeini himself would have been deprived 
of regular informed consent and control over their operations. In fact, following 
Khomeini's frank declaration mat hijacking and hostage-taking were contrary 
to Islamic law, neither did "Islamic Jihad" release any of the hostages already 
taken nor did pro-Iranian groups desist from future hijackings or hostage-
takings. 
Another circumstance characterized many terrorist actions that have 
been strongly linked to Iran, namely, the timing of the incidents. Most of diese 
incidents seem either to have been timed to quash conciliatory diplomatic 
initiatives by the institutionalists or else were timed to maximize the internal 
political advantage of the revolutionists. Some examples illustrate this as 
follows: 
On 18 May 1985 Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faysal visited Tehran, 
the first such visit by a member of die Saudi ruling family since me 1979 
revolution. This trip was aimed at opening channels of communication and 
reconciliation between Iran and die more conservative Arab states of die Persian 
Gulf. At the same time mat he was holding talks with die President, Majlis 
Speaker and Prime Minister of Iran, parcel bombs exploded in the streets of 
Riyadh. A terrorist faction, claiming to be die "Islamic Jihad" group, acknowl-
edged responsibility in a message in which it stated: 
Nobody should believe mat Saudi attempts at rapproachment 
witii the Islamic Republic will make us hesitate to carry out our 
plans.23 
This referred to "Jihad's" aim of toppling die Saudi monarchy by violent 
revolution. The attempted reconciliation fell dirough. 
Just a few days earlier (IS May), "Jihad" had issued an ultimatum to 
Kuwait and die United States demanding die release of tiiose convicted for die 
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12 December 1983 bombing of the US and French Embassies in Kuwait City and 
threatening "terrible consequences" for both if its demands were not met24 
Following the debacle of the visit of the Saudi Foreign Minister to Tehran, 
President cAli Khamenehi made a rather conciliatory Friday Prayers sermon 
addressed to the leaders of the Shaykhdoms. But, on the following day, (24 
May), a suicide car-bomber tried to ram the limousine of the Emir of Kuwait, 
exploding his vehicle and slightly wounding the Emir, who was sped away by 
his guards. Kuwaiti security police were able to identify the bomber as an Iraqi 
member of the Tehran-based Al Dcf-wa Party. In these two cases (the bombing 
in Riyadh and the attempted bombing of the Emir of Kuwait) one can see that 
there were not only certain external targets of each particular terrorist attack but 
also internal targets as well. On the other hand, not only has the timing of 
certain terrorist events linked to Iran spoiled the institutionalist politicians' 
prospects of effecting a more conciliatory foreign policy, but sometimes it also 
contributed directly to the political fortunes of the revolutionist faction within 
Iran. The 5 April 1988 hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airways Boeing 747, with some 
female members of the Kuwaiti royal family being taken hostage aboard, 
coincided with the Majlis elections being held then in Iran. This event only 
boosted the political fortunes of Ayatullah Karrubi, the political figure linked 
most directly to the hijackers, who won the second largest tally of parliamentary 
votes behind Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the Majlis Speaker. This enabled him to 
succeed Hashemi-Rafsanjani in mat capacity once Rafsanjani was elected 
President in die summer of 1989. 
Insofar as control over the terrorist operations sponsored by Iran was not 
centralized, nor subject to some sort of systematic, non-partisan review, they 
evidently passed into the control of revolutionist partisans within the Iranian 
government and military bureaucracy who used these operations to exert 
internal coercion in the pursuit of their own political agenda. This hypothesized 
decentralization and politicization of Iran's sponsorship of terrorism abroad fits 
well with the reports of others specializing in the study of the Islamic resurgence. 
Augustus R. Norton's study of the Amal movement in Lebanon contains 
a description of the formal linkage between Tehran and Hizb'allah?5 The 
Tehran end was the Supreme Defense Council, in charge of Iranian military 
policy and answerable to Khomeini, consisting of the Iranian President, Majlis 
Speaker, IRGC Commander, and heads of the Armed Forces. As the Supreme 
Defense Council was charged with overall policy formulation rather than 
specifics of operations, the latter would have fallen under the jurisdiction of the 
IRGC Liberation Movements Department, a preserve of the revolutionist 
faction. The Lebanese end was the Majlis al Shura (Consultative Assembly) 
consisting of ranking Lebanese clergymen, such as Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah, and key laymen, such as Hussein Musawi, who are connected with 
Hizb'allah. Other observers, however, including Robin Wright, mamtam that 
Fadlallah lacks a precise position in the Hizb'allah command structure, and that 
no straightforward identity can be assumed between the Hizb'allah militia and 
the grouping of terrorist operatives known as "Islamic Jihad."26 As this 
Consultative Assembly met only infrequently from 1983 until 1987, usually in 
the presence of either the military attaché of die Iranian Embassy in Damascus 
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or the Iranian chargé d'affairs in Beirut, the actual on-going link between 
Hizb'allah and the revolutionists in Tehran was the Iranian Embassy in Damas-
cus.27 Moreover, that Embassy was most actively involved in terrorist activities 
in Lebanon during cAli Akbar Muhtashami's tenure as Ambassador, one of the 
foremost leaders of the revolutionist faction in Tehran.28 In short, the actual 
chain of command was from the revolutionists to the IRGC Liberations 
Movement office in Tehran, to Muhtashami in Damascus, to IRGC and "Islamic 
Jihad" operatives in Lebanon rather than through the formal structure of Imam 
to the Supreme Defense Council in Tehran, to the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, 
and then to the Hizb'allah Majlisal-Shira in Lebanon. 
This decentralization of terrorist operations reflects the factionalism 
within the Islamic Republic rather than being merely a product of institu-
tional compartmentalization meant to maintain the security of such opera-
tions. Beginning in 1985 the revolutionists began to encourage increased 
anti-Western terrorist activity among their sponsored groups in order to neu-
tralize the efforts of institutionalists, such as Khamenehi, Foreign Minister 
cAli Akbar Vilayati and Hashemi-Rafsanjani, (who previously had appeared 
to side with the revolutionists) to seek an end to Iran's diplomatic isolation.29 
When the revolutionists overreached themselves through the kidnapping of 
Syria's chargé d'affairs in Tehran, Mahmud Ayat, the institutionalists were 
able to persuade Khomeini to approve the arrest of Mehdi Hashemi, the 
erstwhile "Mir Hashem," and to close the World Islamic Movements office, 
transferring its formal authority to the imtitutionalist-dominated Foreign 
Ministry. However, this move did not give the Iranian government more 
control over Hizb'allah, whose members had personal ties to Iranian 
revolutionists rather than to bureaucratic offices as such. Nor did this move 
by Hashemi-Rafsanjani and the others represent more than a tactical decision 
to down-play Iran's external revolutionary agenda in order to gain more 
foreign support with which to pursue the war with Iraq. Indeed, according 
to Bruce Hoffman the same institutionalists later undertook increased terror-
ist activity in Europe, largely because they could not rely on the Lebanese 
terrorist groups that had been sponsored by their own domestic rivals among 
the revolutionists.30 
There is another sense in which the terrorist operational capacity has 
become effectively autonomous: just as these operations tend to reflect the 
internal political dynamics of the internecine politicking within Iran, so too, 
have the operations conducted by surrogates in Lebanon come to reflect more 
the internal dynamics of the power struggles between rival factions within 
Lebanon, with ever less reference to Iran's own sense of priorities in that region. 
This was most dramatically shown in the tragic cases of the Vincennes downing 
of the Iran Air airbus and the murder of Colonel William Higgins in Lebanon. 
When the Vincennes incident occurred on 3 July 1988, the captors of the US 
hostages in Lebanon did no more than issue some threats against their lives. 
However, when a Hizb'allah leader, Shaykh Abdul Karim Ubaid, was captured 
by Israeli agents on 29 July 1989,///zZ>'a//a/i murdered Higgins in reprisal. Had 
Higgins' captors been fully dependent on and responsive to Iranian wishes, it 
seems unlikely that they would have left the hostages unharmed following the 
29 
Fall 1991 
Vincennes incident, in which over 200 Iranian civilians were killed, only later 
to have taken revenge for the abduction of one Lebanese Shicite religious leader. 
Similarly, it is not entirely clear whether the recent release of Western hostages 
is the result of influence exerted from Iran or the product of changing political 
dynamics in Lebanon (such as Syria's effective pacification of the country and 
the marginalization of extremist groups) and the new context of Arab-Israeli 
relations in the wake of the Gulf War. It is possible all three factors exerted some 
influence. 
These terrorist groups would have a continuing congruity of interests 
with the revolutionists, since an institutionalist regime in Tehran might discon-
tinue sponsorship and cut off the considerable material aid that has been given 
to those groups. The latter, particularly Hizb'allah in Lebanon, would share in 
die domestic political misfortunes of the Iranian revolutionists since, without 
continuing military aid and diplomatic assistance/protection, they would then be 
less able to defend themselves against rival military forces, such as the Syrian 
army or the Amal militia. Thus, both revolutionists and their client groups have 
every motive to cooperate in sabotaging any attempt by the institutionalists to 
exclude the revolutionists totally from power in Tehran. 
CONCLUSIONS 
If regional and world events do not directly influence the domestic 
politics within the Islamic Republic there is no reason to assume that Tehran will 
change its fundamental foreign policy in response to those external events. In 
fact, Khomeini's death, the outcome of Operation DESERT STORM, and the 
collapse of communism could provide the context for the continuation, and 
perhaps even increase, in the resort by Iran to low-intensity conflict as a means 
to its foreign policy ends. 
When Khomeini agreed to die cease-fire with Iraq, he legitimized a 
course of action which otherwise would have remained doubtful for his 
successors to undertake on their own. Likewise, however, he never renounced 
the right of the Islamic Republic to resort to violence in order to achieve its goals. 
Many of his pronouncements in the last year of his life can only be understood 
as affirming the legitimacy of terrorism and as giving the Islamic state unlimited 
licence to use such means. On 7 January 1988 Khomeini publicly adopted the 
position that the Islamic Republic, for reasons of state, was permitted not only 
to act against the decrees of the Quran, but even to compel Muslim believers to 
disobey the Quranic injunctions. On 14 February 1989 Khomeini sentenced 
Salman Rushdie to death on charges of blasphemy, thus dispelling hopes in the 
West that Iran was embarking on a more moderate path following its cease-fire 
with Iraq. That Khomeini's successor asfaqih, Ayatullah cAli Khamenehi, has 
openly reaffirmed this death sentence against Rushdie on each of the anniver-
saries of its promulgation only confirms the essential continuity of Tehran's 
policy in the post-Khomeini era. 
The defeat of the Iraqi Ba^hist regime during Operation DESERT 
STORM has done more than merely enhance Iran's relative strategic and 
military position in the Persian Gulf region. The two main indigenous ideologi-
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cal forces hostile to western interests in the Middle East have been pan-Arab 
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Both movements implicitly deny the 
legitimacy of the existing nation-state system in the Middle East, viewing the 
current states and boundaries in the Middle East as artifacts of European 
colonialism.31 However, both movements are also mutually antagonistic insofar 
as pan-Arab nationalism has a secular, anti-traditionalistic orientation, and is 
based on a chauvinistic view of the Arabs' superiority over other nations, 
including other Muslim peoples such as the Iranians. Khomeini's Islamic 
fundamentalism, which calls for the rule of the Shari'ah in the Islamic nations, 
abominates the secularism of the pan-Arab nationalists. In this respect one can 
view the Iraq-Iran war not merely as a border war or clash between two strong-
willed leaders, but as an ideological holy war between pan-Arabism, champi-
oned in die form of Iraqi Bathism, and Islamic fundamentalism, championed by 
Iran.32 Saddam Hussein's pretensions and failures in the recent Persian Gulf war 
may have deflated nationalistic hopes among Arab Muslims, but the defeat 
leaves intact the aspirations offered by Iran's pan-Islamic alternative. Tehran 
has been self-consciously seeking to assume the leadership role in opposing 
Israel that Arab leaders have largely abandoned. The currently cordial relations 
Iran is pursuing towards members of the Gulf Cooperation Council as tactical 
friends would be quite compatible with a long-term pan-Islamist foreign policy 
that views them as strategic enemies. 
The collapse of communism also has weakened the radical Arab nation-
alist regimes by undercutting external Soviet diplomatic and military supportfor 
them in opposing Israel. Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine - General Command, that formerly depended on Syria or Libya for 
financial support, has found another sponsor in Tehran. Likewise other terrorist 
or political groups within the Arab world may tum increasingly to Tehran for 
state sponsorship and resources as a result of the reduced Soviet aid available to 
Arab states and organizations. 
Even following Operation DESERT STORM Tehran has not repudiated 
terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Since the death of Khomeini there 
have been thirteen violent incidents that bear the marks of Iranian state 
sponsored terrorism, five of which occurred after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait33 
The most prominent of these was the assassination of former Iranian prime 
minister, Shahpur Bakhtiyar, along with an aide in Paris on 6 August 1991. One 
of two men arrested on charges of complicity in this murder implicated the 
Iranian Ministry of Post, Telephone and Telegraph as having provided forged 
documents for the assassins.34 Even if the Iranian state did not order diese 
murders and attacks, they would indicate at least continuing support for terrorist 
activities by revolutionist factions within the ruling circles. 
Fundamental change in Iran's policies would require a degree of 
consensus among the elite factions within the Islamic Republic that has not been 
forthcoming in the years since the death of the Imam Khomeini. Ironically, an 
Iranian initiative for amelioration in relations with the United States, the one 
political event within Iran that might portend an eventual decrease in official 
sponsorship of terrorism abroad by Iran, might equally herald an increase in the 
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number and lethality of terrorist operations against American targets, including 
possibly civilian targets abroad or at home. Such attacks might not amount to 
a sustained systematic campaign, such as France experienced during the terror 
bombing campaign in 1986, but they could achieve the level of shock and 
outrage that was experienced as a result of the bombing of Pan Am 103. In effect, 
Iran's external terrorist capacity allows the revolutionists to hold the rest of the 
Iranian political establishment hostage to a more revolutionist line. 
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